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Factors Affecting SOviet Railroad Traffic
Control of Freight Traffic
Railroads occupy an altogether different position in Soviet economic
life from that in Western countries. Railroad transportation is some-
thing to be conserved and minimized under Soviet doctrine. Indeed,
transportation is regarded by the Soviet party and planning authorities
as something of a necessary evil and the traffic that necessitates its
existence is to be bent in such a way as to minimize its demand for
service and adjusted to the least physical outlay feasible. The Western
view of fostering traffic development through service and rate improve-
ment, adjustment, and experimentation has no counterpart, nor is
there any competition for traffic among railroads or between railroads
and other carriers, which in Western countries results in active rate
warfare, competitive solicitation, and service concessions to particular
traffic in order to secure or retain1 TheSoviet shipper faces a single
railroad administration and the position of the latter is strong.2
Thus, according to Soviet theory, freight traffic is not a phenomenon
that the railroad administration, its superintendents, or its agents
should accept as beyond their control. Indeed, they are expected to
take an active part in planning efficient transport movement, in
detecting and stamping out irregularities which undermine railroad
efficiency, and in using the means at their disposal to influence shippers
and receivers of freight in ways considered desirable. To be sure there
are continual complaints of shortfall on the part of the transport
authorities at all levels—criticism particularly of the passive attitude
that carriers should accept whatever is offered for transportation
1Overcertain routes, of course, both rail and water services are available and
on very short hauls motor transport now offers an alternative.The general Tate
level, particularly on bulk commodities, often results in a combination of lower
rates as well as superior service where railroads are used in place of water carriers.
But these rail rate levels are the result of general policy, not of specific competitive
adjustments, and are, in particular cases, modified by arbitrary increases when
directly competitive with water or joint rail-water routes in an effort to shed traffic
from the rails.
2American shippers chafed under a benevolent U.S. Railroad Administration dur-
ing and immediately after the first war. They would find the dependent position
of the Soviet shipper impossible to comprehend. As the recent American railroad
mission puts it, "They [the railroads] have a peculiar relationship to their 'shippers.'
In Russia the opportunity to ship is a privilege."(Railway Age, August 1960,
pp. 9-14.)
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between all points.Thus, the Western theory of common carrier
obligation is definitely out of place in Soviet thinking, yet it seems to
linger on in the actions of the railway servants.
Numerous factors not ordinarily present elsewhere affect the growth
and pattern of Soviet rail traffic. Some arise out of the general insti-
tutional and economic context in which the Soviet railways operate.
Of great importance is the full six-day workweek and various labor
practices designed to secure the fuller utilization of the industrial
plant,3 together with the established principle that transportation
equipment should be loaded and unloaded seven days a week. More-
over, the emphasis placed on conservation of the railroad plant leads
in many instances to the staffing of shipping and receiving departments
around the clock. This has been facilitated in the Soviet Union by
an abundance of common labor and an absence of overtime or of
penalty pay for night and Sunday work. Labor awaits the cars rather
than the reverse, and loading and unloading norms expressed in hours
can practicably be substituted for the demurrage tariff and its forty-
eight hours free time which is common elsewhere.4 The great sig-
nificance of the longer workweek for rail efficiency is made manifest
by the postwar conversion of American industry to the forty-hour week.
For this development has been calculated by the Association of
American Railroads to have cost as much as 15 per cent of the capacity
of our freight car fleet, even though it had not been our custom
generally to work more than half a day on Saturday.
While the techniques of Soviet plant managers in their efforts to
fulfill the plan and to avoid censure often appear to produce irreg-
ularities in the rate of production throughout a month, these much-
criticized irregularities are probably smaller at the shipping docks and,
in any event, are hardly as severe as the weekly and monthly variations
in rail traffic in a Western economy. Moreover, the evenness of the
Soviet flow is less often and much less severely affected by holidays.
This should result in a more even traffic, both in origination and
delivery, as well as a steadier car handling by shippers and receivers,
with a highly beneficial effect upon car turnaround.If a yearly
average turnaround of fifteen days can be achieved in the United
3Avirtually universal full six-day week has not existed in the U.S. during the
time covered by our rail statistics.
4Aprobably characteristic overemphasis is reflected in the following: ". .. many
factory managers keep warehouse crews working three shifts, seven days a week.
Factories retain an 'enormous number of reserve loaders' who could otherwise be
used on assembly lines, a top Soviet economist (Edmund K. Faltermayer in
The Wall Street Journal, July 26, 1960, p. 1.)
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States at a high level of business with the present workweek and with
our customary periodicity, something approximating an eleven-day
turnaround would be expected in the Soviet system if only these
differences in the regularity of flow were taken into account and no
allowance were made for the immediate attention given to car loading
and unloading with maximum useful forces. The latter easily subtracts
an additional two days.
It is, however, also to be noted that the Soviet seasonal pattern in
rail traffic differed from our own pattern during the period for which
monthly data are available in a manner favorable to the Soviet system.
Indeed little appeared that could be described as a seasonal pattern,
other than a weakness in the winter months. In part, this is the result
of the absence of certain commercial practices which affect seasonal
patterns elsewhere; in part, it is influenced by the seasonality of the
inland water commerce; in part, it results from the stronger influence
of the upward trend of rail traffic; but whatever its causes, it is con-
ducive to more effective year-round utilization of the rail plant. No
recent data are available on the seasonal pattern of Soviet traffic, but
carloadings by months have been published through 1938 and it is
assumed that little unfavorable change has occurred. Data for the years
1934 to 1938 are shown in Table 11. The pattern is obviously affected
by trend and in some years the growth trend is of sufficient prominence
to expunge the seasonal pattern, as in 1935 when the year's increase
over 1934 was substantial. The whole period covered by these data is
one of rising traffic, with the exception of 1938 when there was a
TABLE 11
AVERAGE DAILY CARLOADINGS OF SOVIET RAILWAYS, 1934-38, BY MONTH
1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
January 51,800 50,661 77,603 79,340 75,241













May 57,217 69,251 92,442 95,945 92,626
June 57,816 72,665 89,944 97,976 96,709
July 56,669 72,952 90,415 98,711 96,322
August 57,169 73,626 90,216 97,617 94,766
September 56,553 74,664 90,008 96,867 94,621
October 58,492 75,159 86,526 94,108 93,924
November 57,970 75,651 89,734 90,918
December 54,373 74,550 80,391 78,041 75,992
Full Year 55,717 68,098 86,660 89,833 88,046
SouRcE: 1. V. Kochetov, Statistika zheleznodorozhnoi [Statistics of Rail-
road Transportation], Moscow, 1941, p. 61.
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minuscule decline in loadings. That year gives the appearance of a
break in trend toward midyear representing a change from a rising
movement of traffic to a decline. Nothing resembling a fall peak is
apparent; the tendency for heavy agricultural loadings to produce
heavier September and October loadings was offset by a general decline.
The relationships between the high• and low months of each year are
shown below, together with the change between annual. averages:
Annual
Per Cent of Average Increase






Thatthe Soviet roads are affected by seasonal conditions in agricul-
ture and by the closing of river navigation in the winter season surely
is apparent, but the conditions presented do not appear to require
the maintenance of substantial surpluses of equipment during a good
part of the year for brief service in a fall peak, a situation which must
have a considerable favorable effect on the operating averages. The
strong upward pattern of traffic during the last decade suggests that
trend may have been of more importance than seasonal during this
period also.
Although the railroads were favored by a marked flattening of
the seasonal pattern during World War II, a substantial seasonal
pattern has been evident throughout most of their history. During
the fairly steady year-to-year levels of rail traffic of the 1920's, it was
customary for October loadings to exceed those of the low month
by from 30 to 40 per cent.5 During years of cyclical trend, declines
have been marked by a moderation of the fall peak which has some-
times brought it below the spring peak, while recovery has been marked
by rapidly developed and exceptionally sharp peaks. There is no
year since World War II that could be considered "normal" in the
light of postwar adjustment, recession and recovery, steel and coal
strikes, and Korea.Nevertheless it remains true that in any year
when a recession is not in progress the fall peak poses difficulties for
the rail carriers and has, in every year except 149, 1954, and 1957-59,
5 agraphic illustration of the variation of ton-miles, which are closely related
to loadings, see Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles,
New York, NBER, 1946, p. 45. The loadings can be secured from and are graphically
shown in the weekly carloading reports of the Car Service Division, Association of
American Railroads.
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been accompanied by moderate to severe car shortages. An interesting
analysis of the effect of the seasonal pattern on requirements of the
carriers for car ownership is given by Loree for 1906 to 1919: he charts.
the car idleness and computes the surplus of cars which would have
resulted had the 1919 car mileage been secured in each year as well
as the 1916 percentage of average carload to average car capacity;
He thus develops surpluses ranging from 80,478 cars in 1917 to 853,843
in 1915 with a car ownership in the vicinity of 2,300,000 cars.6
This does not suppose a complete suppression of the peak, but only
the flattening characteristic of war periods.
As will appear below,7 the absence of a marked seasonal pattern in
Soviet freight traffic is not necessarily the result in all years of an
absence of seasonal in traffic demands, but reflects rather an absence
of accommodation of the. plant to peak requirements, with the result
that accumulations of unshipped freight may develop in spring and
fall periods. These have been studied only for the critical first half of
the 1930's, but it may reasonably be supposed that some seasonal
accumulations are accepted as necessary for transport efficiency, with
the result that the railroads work under year-round traffic pressures
more nearly comparable to those of our annual averages. An argument
can be made for comparison of Soviet operating data with our October
rather than our yearly data.It may be that the pressures for quick
realization of agricultural market values receive scant recognition and
that certain categories of seasonal consumer goods are absent. In any
event, the position of railroads in relation to shippers' desires differs
markedly from that in our highly competitive situation. Whereas our
calculations of car requirements inevitably start with an estimate of
October peak traffic and October operating factors, Soviet analysts are
more likely to resort to the use of annual averages and give scant
recognition to seasonal demands.
Just as it is apparently considered unnecessary to provide a plant
and equipment adequate to care for peaks of traffic with normal
dispatch, so also several other features characteristic of competitive
systems are absent. The limited and slow passenger service has already
been referred to.The virtual absence of commercial privileges—
holding for reconsigning, billing to order, tender in advance of ship-
ping instructions, stopping to partially load and unload—which have
been estimated to cost more than a day in the turnaround of the
6L.F. Loree, Railroad Freight Transportation, New York, 1922, pp. 277-279.
TSee Appendix A.
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average U.S. car, must contribute to high car utilization.8 Moreover,
the relative absence of ocean-borne import and export traffic, the
absence of a water traffic even remotely comparable to our Great Lakes
system, and the practice in any event of limiting car detention at
points of rail-water interchange avoid the substantial accumulations
of cars under load which customarily lie behind our ocean and lake
ports. It is not uncommon for from 3 to 5 per cent of our car supply to
be absorbed in such port accumulations.
Use of Rates in Control of Traffic
It is uncertain what relative weight should be placed on rates and
other factors that affect the movement of Soviet traffic, but Soviet
administrators obviously place considerable reliance on them. The
proposition familiar to Western jurisprudence that transport rates
should reflect transportation conditions and maintain a cold neutrality
toward economic objectives, regional aspirations, or changes in political
goals, though it is sometimes honored in the breach, has no parallel in
Russia. Neither under the tzars nor under the Soviet regime has there
been any reluctance to use transport rates to influence economic be-
havior and to assist political, military, and economic policies. Neither
agreements among shippers and carriers nor longstanding rate relation-
ships existing without complaint stand in the way of adjustments that
are believed to provide incentives to desired behavior or erect barriers
to undesired behavior on the part of shippers. But whereas rate-making
practices under the tzars tended to support the pecuniary interests
of particular favored economic groups, these practices in the Soviet
regime have been devoted largely to stimulating the economy of use
of transport facilities.Under both systems virtually universal use
has been made of distance scales of rates with varying taper$ and
adjusted to particular rates per ton-mile at varying lengths of haul.
And this type of rate is employed for water as well as for rail transport
8SeeLoree, RailroadTransportation, p.266.See alsoFreight Traffic Report,
Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Appendix I, Exhibit 222 (December 15.
1938, carload transactions), where substantial variations in intermediate terminal
time for various commodity groups can be attributed to this factor.It is not to be
expected that the up to thirteen diversions which have occurred in the U.S. grain
and perishable trades would be permitted in the Soviet system, nor that com-
modities would be held under load awaiting sale for periods sometimes exceeding
thirty days.Certain of these practices can be pursued by the Soviet shipper at the
cost of monetary penalties and at the risk of administrative suppression.Itis
characteristic of most such practices in the United States that they are effected at a
small charge, but carry with them from twenty-four to forty-eight hours free time
under the demurrage tariff.
9Taperis a declining rate per ton-mile with an increase in the length of haul.
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and with no apparent effort to equalize the two on point-to-point
hauls or to establish differentials related to quality of service, but
rather with a direct application of distances via the rate-making routes
regardless of the relative circuity of water routes.'°
The Russian State Council in 1887 assumed comprehensive control
of railroad rates and promptly undertook a revision of the grain rates,
spurred by the fact that grain was one of the most important com-
modities in rail traffic and by far the largest item of export. The
Council introduced a uniform distance scale for application throughout
the Empire and applied a marked taper. The existence of established
grain production in Central Russia shortly led, however, to modifica-
tions to provide very low short-distance rates for the benefit of the
landowners of that region while long-haul rates were subjected to
increases. When in 1896 the western portion of the Trans-Siberian
Railway was opened, the principle of inverse taper was introduced for
the purpose of protecting the established areas.Thus while the
portion of the haul lying between 895 and 1,094 miles took a rate of
0.250 cents per ton-mile, the charge rose to 0.391 cents for distances
between 1,095 and 1,888 miles, and for greater distances to 0.564
cents.11 While these rates appear to have discouraged the develop-
ment of grain growing in the newly opened areas, they were far less
severe in their treatment of the long hauls than are present Soviet
tariffs.
The characteristic form of Soviet rates as well as the remarkable
simplicity of the rate system are illustrated by the rates approved by
the USSR Council of Ministers in November 1948.12 Since they apply
to twelve major commodity groups including coal and coke, ores of
all kinds, iron and steel, lumber, building materials, fertilizers, sugar
beets, and potatoes, these rates cover a great part of the total rail
traffic.13 There is only a limited spread among commodity groups,
lOAn odd result is that rates for an inferior water service frequently exceed rail
rates between the same points and provide an additional cause for frustration in
the effort to increase the use of the improved waterways.
11SeeH. R. Meyer, Government Regulation of Railway Rates, New York, 1905,
Chapter VII.
12Asyet there has been very little study of Soviet rail rates by Western scholars.
Some material is contained in Holland Hunter's Soviet Transportation Policy,
Cambridge, Mass., 1957, pp. 209-227, and in his paper 'Costs, Freight Rates, and
Location Decisions in the USSR" in Value and Plan: Economic Calculation and
Organization in Eastern Europe, edited by Gregory Grossman, Berkeley, 1960, pp.
322-337.
13lu.I. Koldomasov, Osnovy planirovaniia perevozok na zheleznodorozhnom
transporte [The Principles of Planning Shipments in Railroad Transportation],
Moscow, 1949, Table 22, p. 155.
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the beginning blocks of the scale placing coal and coke, iron and
other ores, and pyrites on the same basis of 12 kopecks per ton-
kilometer for hauls up to twenty-five kilometers. The highest basis
is shown for potatoes at 22 kopecks. In many instances, the same rate
per ton-kilometer is continued up to fifty kilometers, but on peat,
shales, and sugar beets the rates per ton-kilometer are lower, for
between twenty-five and fifty kilometers than they are for under twenty-
five kilometers. Compared with average revenues somewhat above
5 kopecks, these high short-haul rates are designed to divert very
short-haul traffic to motor trucks. After fifty kilometers the rates taper
down, reaching a minimum rate per ton-kilometer at various lengths
of haul ranging from 6.67 kopecks at 150 kilometers for peat to
3.6 kopecks for coal and coke at 1,500 kilometers.14 Ores, however,
reach a minimum of 2.9 kopecks at 700 kilometers and other commod-
ities reach varying minima at other lengths of haul. Beyond the
distance at which the minimum rate per ton-kilometer is reached,
inverse taper is applied and the ton-kilometer rate gradually increases
with distance until the maximum rate is attained at 3,000 kilometers.
Thus the ton-kilometer rate for coal is 4.02 kopecks over 3,000 kilo-
meters and for ores 4.47 kopecks. For peat the rate reaches 12.51
kopecks at this distance. The character of the commodity and its
availability(distribution territorially)obviously have affected the
choice of distances at which the minimum ton-kilometer rates apply.
The application of increasing. ton-kilometer rates to growing lengths
of haul can, increase the actual rate very rapidly. Inverse taper, thus,
can be a strong deterrent to "hauls of excessive length" which the
Soviets attempt to keep under control, just as the high shorthaul
rates can be relied upon to encourage the relief of rail transport by
trucks in movements within terminal districts and elsewhere where
truck movement is likely to be economical. As will be observed
later, the monthly planning of traffic also has its effect and establishes
norms for, the selection of the several available types of carrier.
In order to encourage movement by water carrier, whether on the
rivers or in the coasting trade, and in recognition of the lower costs
of water transport for hauls .of equivalent length, water carrier rates
per ton-kilometer are generally fixed 30 per cent below those estab-
lished for rail hauls. This does not mean, however, that there is any
14ByWestern standards this may be considered a very long haul for coal, but it
can be explained by Soviet geography which lacks a Great Lakes system and effective
east-west water routes and has to cope with the remoteness of some heavy industry
from appropriate grades of coal.
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fixed differential between rail and water rates, as frequently prevails
in the United States where rates per ton between fixed points are
related rather than ton-kilometer rates.15 On the contrary, since water
routes are usually longer than rail routes between any two points, the
differential will be less and, in the case of highly circuitous water
routes, the rates by water may actually exceed those by. rail. Thus,
for gasoline from Syzran to Moscow a river haul of 1,913 kilometers
replaces a rail haul of 914 kilometers and the water rate exceeds that
for rail. A similar phenomenon is observed for flour from Gorky to
Leningrad where a water haul of 1,603 kilometers replaces a rail haul
of 1,145 kilometers. Or again in the mixed rail-water haul, from
Nizhnedneprovsk to Orsha for rolled iron and steel transshipping
at Gomel, a joint rail-water route of 1,169 kilometers replaces an
all-rail route of 1,005 kilometers and the resulting charges are higher,
despite the reduction of the rail transshipment and water rates by
30 per cent for such joint hauls.'6
Because of the inferior service available by water—due partly to
the slowness of navigation and partly to the delays in transshipment—
more direct methods have been deemed necessary to divert traffic from
rail lines to parallel water routes during the navigation season.17
Whereas Western countries consider that reduced seasonal rail rates
are necessary to meet water competition and retain business for the
railroads, the Soviet authorities decree increased seasonal railroad rates
on selected routes for particular commodities in order to discourage
the use of rail, routes and encourage water hauls.'8 Selected increased
rates are also named in particular instances to discourage distribution
of commodities over exceptionally long distances and to discourage
cross hauls. For example, the rates were increased 100 per cent for
coal originating on the Tomsk and Karaganda Road and moving to
stations west of Kuibyshev and Ul'yanovsk. An increase of 50 per cent
15 In our experience a widening of the differential has frequently diverted traffic—
even at times high-grade traffic—to water routes despite the slower and less frequent
service and the greater probability of loss or damage! For an illuminating discus-
sion, see John L. Hazard, Crisis in Coastal Shipping: The Atlantic-Gulf Case, Austin;
1955, Chapter IV.
lOAnextensivetableofcomparisonsisgiveninKoldomasov,Osnovy
planirovaniia, Appendix 3.The 30 per cent concession for combined rail-water
routes is referred to as privileged and is designed to encourage short-hauling of' the
railroads by effecting, transfer to water for completion of the hauls.
17 The short navigation season imposes an unusual bar to inducing shippers to a
seasonal shift of practices.There is some evidence that the efficiency of water
operations is substandard and that the administration is less than active in soliciting
water routing of eligible business.
18 Between a limited number of points a 100 per cent increase in rail rates applies
for all commodities dunng the navigation season.
71w
FACTORSAFFECTING SOVIET FREIGHT TRAFFIC
was prescribed for all loads of sugar beets in excess of 300 kilometers.
Some seventy-one such special rates were established by a decree of
the Council of Ministers on September 9, 1948, in what appears to be
a continuing practice, some designed to deal with the availability
of water routes during the navigation season, others to apply at all
times to hauls considered wasteful. A detailed list and description
of these increases are shown in Koldomasov.l° Rate disparities of the
magnitude that result from grafting these special decrees upon the
normal tariff system cannot help but discourage to some extent un-
desired rail hauls, although the inflexibility of the system because of
the administrative impediments in the way of rate changes by min-
isterial decree prevents reflection of conditions in detail as well as
prompt variation with changes of circumstances and may,thus,
occasionally pull in wrong directions. More direct methods are also
employed which will be considered at a later point.
Whatever the effects of the efforts to influence transportation demand
through rates, it is important to note the absence of the stimulus,
characteristic in Western countries, that results from accommodation
of rate structures to competitive influences. The Western tradition
is not to discourage, but to encourage, transportation, and in a competi-
tive system this produces all manner of rate stimulants designed to
expand areas of distribution, permit cross penetration of markets,
and enhance the length of haul.Grouping, the establishment of
common points, equalization, and the use of differentials that offset
production costs or other factors are noteworthy for their absence in
the Soviet scheme. Low rates on basic commodities to encourage
industrialization have generally been applied, but have usually ad-
hered to the distance principle. To the extent that these practices
have successfully promoted transportation in the West, their absence
from Soviet policy must be judged to produce a difference in traffic
conditions.
- Zoning
Zoning of freight movement and of commodity distributionis a
practice with which Great Britain and the United States became
familiar during the two world wars. In neither country was it applied
vigorously or extensively and it has generally been considered as a
substantial failure.2° Tolling was also used during wartime in the
19Ibid.,Appendix I.
20 of coal by the U.S. Railroad Administration in the first war is generally
pointed to as the outstanding failure.Rigid administration and failure to accom-
modate to the various qualities of coal are the chief elements in the indictment.
They are probably weaknesses which are also found in the Soviet practice.
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United Kingdom. Tolling is the interchanging of brand names so
that distribution can be zoned by manufacturers associated in tolling
agreements without affecting the competition of brands on the market.
In a very modest way it was introduced voluntarily by some manu-
facturers in the United States during the inflation after World War II.
Such a complication does not exist in the Soviet Union.
Zoning is, however, an integral part of Soviet planning for traffic
movement. It takes many forms and in some instances is mandatory,
while in other instances it is a plan for general observance subject
to exceptions. For coal, stations are named on particular railroad lines
beyond which a producing field or mine may not ship. They represent,
in effect, transportation divides and appear to be calculated according
to not only the rail mileage, but also the heating value of the coal
which affects the tonnage to be moved.2' Exceptions are said to be
made for special quality coals for metallurgical and chemical purposes.
The routing plan for cement specifies the railroads, portions of rail-
roads, and terminal districts which may be served from origins on the
various railroad systems subject to adjustment of market regions of
varying demands to available supply. Molding sands are to be dis-
tributed from particular pits to named oblasti. A joint decree of the
Ministries of the Food Industry and of Transportation governs the
distribution of salt from origin stations, specifying the rail lines to
which delivery may be made from such origins. The theory for
analyzing traffic movements with a view to developing limitsis
reasonably well worked out. What it is impossible to ascertain is the
effect of these measures, although it appears that they must have some
effect in conserving transportation.
Despite considerable discussion among transport economists and
others, despite a multitude of decrees, and despite planning techniques
designed to analyze desired movement in advance and give it direction,
Soviet officials never cease to criticize wasteful transportation, exces-
sive hauls, cross hauls, and the like. Techniques are evidently far
from perfect in apFlication and considerable initiative still rests with
local shipping units. This initiative is not always employed in ways
calculated to satisfy railroad officialdom or the Ministry.Thus,
Beshchev, the Minister of Transportation, complained in 1954 that
too little progress had been made in eliminating irrational hauls,22
21Whatis theory and what is actual practice is difficult to discern in this and
other matters.
22Speech before All-Union Conference of Aktiv of Railroad Transportation Per-
sonnel, condensed from Pravda of May 19, 1954, in Current Digest of the Soviet
Press, 1954, No. 21, p. 4.
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while Kaganovich was more vehement and cited many examples. Rail-
road transport "is still forced to haul excess freight and to make
extremely long, counter, and other thriftless movements on which huge
sums are expended. Shippers and consignees are not much interested
in where a commodity comes from—they are not interested in rates
nor do they protest the long distances. They will do anything to get
the commodity."23 The polemics of Kaganovich emphasize examples
of inefficiency which can always be found in any large and complicated
system; the writings of the analysts describe the system as it is supposed
to work. Somewhere between is the actual position and it must• be
judged that the measures here loosely termed zoning have their con-
structive influence, although if Western experience is any guide at all,
this is of the order of 2 or 3 per cent of traffic volume rather than any
more impressive figure.
Of more practical importance is the readiness to embargo non-
priority traffic, sometimes for extended periods, in a way that no carrier
under a competitive system could. This is sometimes to relieve a
particular line or railroad, but may have more extended application.
It provides a means to regulate traffic at the several peaks and at all
times of transport shortage while maintaining essential traffic flows.
And it is an effective method for enforcing zoning schemes or other
studied limitations.
Control of Traffic Variation Through Storage at Origin
A consequence of the failure to provide capacity adequate for peak
demands is enforced storage at origin, as a result of which backlogs
customarily build up that are worked off in the spring. This is a
situation of such long standing that it is apparently not looked upon
as an object of comment save when the shortfall in capacity prevents
moving the accumulations before subsequent seasonal increases in
goods available for shipment develop.Regularity in rail traffic is
highly prized and efforts are made to expand storage at origin to
promote this result. Moreover the building of winter stocks of coal
and metallurgical raw materials at the consuming plants is emphasized
23Speechbefore the Supreme Soviet Session, Council of the Union, reported in
Pravda, April 27, 1954, p. 7, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press., 1954, No. 17. One
of the more astonishing examples which he gives is that about 30 per cent of rail
ton-kilometers in the coal traffic were produced in handling that portion of the
coal traffic which moved beyond 1,800 kilometers.Moreover he cites an increase
in the coal moved beyond 2,600 kilometers from 5.9 per cent of the total in 1952 to
7.1 per cent in 1953.
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in rail as well as water movements.24 Timing of movements for prices
and speculative purposes or with a view to maneuvering the railroads
into a delay claim appears to have no place in the distribution pattern,
nor does storage on cars in advance of shipping instructions. Consider-
able emphasis appears to be given to the country storage of grains,
although a distinctchange in the composition of rail traffic has reduced
the effect of the agricultural crop cycle on the seasonal pattern of
traffic.25It is impossible to compare the contribution that storage
makes to an even transport flow, in the Soviet Union and in Western
countries. There is evidence, however, suggesting a significantly greater
role in the Soviet Union.
Planning of Traffic Movement
Through the regional Shippers' Advisory Boards railroads in the
United States receive quarterly advance estimates of carloadings,
which are helpful in car distribution and in other matters involving
the effective movement of traffic. Soviet railroads have the advantage
of a formal planning procedure, which very likely comes closer to an
accurate forecast and which also serves many other useful purposes
in mitigating the burden of freight traffic and providing for its
effective coordination. These elaborate planning techniques with their
excess of paper work cannot be expected to be without effect, for they
involve detailed cooperation between the railroads and the shipping
ministries and provision is made for check upon plan fulfillment. The
detail of planning provides for the establishment of numerous norms
for car handling, consolidation of shipments, and other matters tending
toward more efficient use of the transport plant. An analysis of plans
will disclose direct and indirect cross hauling and excessive hauls where
the jurisdiction of a single railroad is not broad enough to comprehend
them. Review by shipping ministries then becomes possible in order
to secure superior performance in later plan periods.
24 Such stocking is a necessity at rail-supplied plants to avoid undue delay of
railway cars because of frozen lading. No data have come to view which disclose
its magnitude.
25 The following data (computed from series C-8 in Appendix C) are illustrative:
Per Cent of Total Ton-Kilometers
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The plan procedure was modified in 1939 to provide for monthly
shipment plans which tie together origin and destination and which
are to be prepared by the shipping ministries and subject to review
by the railroads.26 Emphasis is placed on the holding and consolida-
tion of volume from particular origins to particular destinations in
multiple-car consignments up to full trainloads, on the exchange of
supplies among enterprises for the service of consuming ministries in
such a way as to produce minimum hauls, and on similar matters affect-
ing the efficiency of equipment use. Prospective short-line routings are
checked by the rail carriers against line capacity, and prospective over-
loads are coped with by modifying operating practices or resorting,
where necessary, to indirect routing of a portion of the volume over
noncongested lines. As with other aspects of Soviet technique for traffic
control, evaluation of the effects of planning processes is impossible
from available data. Since the whole process is directed toward obtain-
ing efficient use of the transport plant, however, it can only be presumed
to be of some help in this direction.
Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Average Hauls
Notwithstanding allefforts to minimize average hauls and avoid
excessive transportation, Soviet geography and Soviet industrial policy,
particularly in its early emphasis upon large-size plant, have resulted
in longer average rail hauls than in the United States. From the point
of view of minimizing rail hauls, the Soviet distribution of heavy
resources is unfortunate, but Soviet industrial policies have tended to
exaggerate this disadvantage, as is well illustrated by the disregard
of necessary long hauls in the Ural-Kuznetsk Combine.27
It is of vast importance, also, to note fundamental differences in
the transportation geography of the two countries in order to evaluate
the quality of Soviet transportation. The Soviet Union lacks a Great
Lakes system; it lacks a river •route for a main channel of heavy
commodity flow which is as satisfactory as the Monongahela-Ohio-
Kanawha system; it lacks reasonably direct coastwise transportation.
Were it not for the Great Lakes system, the length of the rail haul of
some 130 million tons of ore, coal, and grain in a busy year would have
26Koldomasov'sbook (Osnovy planirovaniia)is in greater part devoted to a
description and discussion of plan techniques but contributeslittletotheir
evaluation.
27SeeHunter, Soviet Transportation, pp. 47-50, and Franklyn D. Holznian, "The
Soviet Ural-Kuznetsk Combine," Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1957,
pp. 368-405.
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to be tripled.28 In the absence of direct connecting coastwise trans-
portation, the rail haul of some 40 million tons of tidewater coal
would be roughly doubled, while some 200 billion ton-miles of
petroleum transportation would have to be accommodated by a new
trunk pipeline net or moved by inland water-rail routes in the absence
of the Gulf-Atlantic coastwise service. In the absence of these water
routes, were American industry distributed as at present, our average
rail haul would be increased some 20 per cent. But the development
of our resource pattern would have followed a different sequence had
the stimulus of the lakes been absent.
The comparison of average hauls in Table 12 below is, for the most
part, limited to the prewar period. The rapid rise of average rail hauls
in the United States since the war is largely the result of a phenomenal
growth of motor transport which has no parallel in the Soviet Union
and which has diverted a large tonnage of short-haul business.29
TABLE 12








1928 318 286 374
1929 317 285 376
1930 316 285 351
1931 329 296 368
1932 347 312 395
1933 342 308 395
1934 337 303 406
1935 841 307 415
1936 337 304 418
1937 337 304 429
1938 356 321 449
1939 351 316 442
1950 416 375 451
1959 445 401 506
SouRcE:U.S.data from Statisticsof Railways, I.C.C.for corresponding years;
Sovietdata from series C-3 in Appendix C.
a All U.S. data rounded to nearest mile.
b Reduced by 10 per cent to adjust approximately to short-line mileage. Occasional
studies have demonstrated circuity in the carload freight service ranging from 12 to
13.8 per cent.See Stuart Daggett, Principles of Inland Transportation, New York,
1955, p. 368, and Transport Economics, January 1956, pp. 5-7.
cConverted into miles at 1.6 kilometers to the mile for easeofcalculation, the
underlying data being somewhat rough for most years.
28Assuming topography, inthe absence of the lake system, permitted direct
diagonal lines across the lakes region with the industry located upon such routes.
29Reportingmotor common carriers,however, now show atraffic-revenue
relationship which implies an average haul of approximately 200 miles.
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Hence comparison with USSR data aredifficultto interpret in the
postwar period. The several postwar observations given, however,
illustrate that Soviet average hauls continue above those of U.S.
railroads.
Corn position of. Freight Traffic
The term "composition" of freight traffic denotes the proportions of
various commodities and types of freight embraced in the total traffic.
It is a necessary object of study if a system of transportation is to be
understood because the character of the traffic affects the plant which
must be provided, the type of equipment needed, the character of
service required, the operating methods, and the operating results.
Moreover, for the purposes of this study, it is of independent value
to gather the available data on commodity composition of traffic since
such information may assist in the evaluation of production data.
Especially where railroad traffic represents so large a proportion of
the whole, its composition may convey a good idea of the make-up of
the economy. It should be recalled, of course, that data on the traffic
of particular commodities are likely to be affected by the same infir-
mities as the total traffic data. Moreover, the Soviet classes of com-
modities do not correspond, in many instances, with the classes
employed elsewhere, so that comparison is difficult and not entirely
30
Composition of traffic can be studied in carloadings, tonnage orig-
inated,tonnage handled,tonnageterminated,ton-mileage,and
TABLE 13
COMPOSITION OF SOVIET FREIGHT TRAFFIC, FIVE-YEAR INTERVALS, 1930-58
(percent of total annual tons originated)
1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1958
Coal and coke 17.3 24.4 25.7 36.0 32.0 30.7 29.6
Petroleum and petroleum
products 5.5 5.8 5.0 5.4 5.2 6.1 6.9
Ores 4.1 6.7 5.6 4.5 5.7 6.6 6.7
Ferrous metals 3.5 4.9 4.6 5.4 5.2 5.7 5.4
Lumberbuildingmaterials 13.0 10.9 7.2 6.7 8.7 7.4 7.5
Firewood 6.3 4.7 3.9 4.4 2.3 1.3 1.1
Mineral building materials 10.8 14.3 18.9 10.6 18.9 19.4 20.0
Grain 10.2 7.7 7.5 5.1 4.7 4.6 4.4
Other freight 29.3 20.6 21.3 21.9 17.5 18.2 18.1
SOURCE:SeriesC-7in Appendix C.
80 Detailedbreakdown by commodities is not available afterthe middle1930's,
noris the precise content. of the present grouping fully defined.Certain changes
in classification have occurred, but this is true of other countries as well.
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revenue. Average haul, which may be computed from two of these
sets of data, as well as average carload may also have their use. For
parallel study with production data, tons originated or terminated
should be the most useful, hence we begin our analysis with a con-
sideration of these data. Table 13 gives the Soviet data.It will be
observed that the composition has been changing over the twenty-five.
year period represented here and a more detailed study could be made
if it served a useful purpose. It will be noted especially that the share
of coal and coke has grown, that it was more than double the 1930
share in 1945 and thereafter fell off somewhat. Petroleum shows a
fair stability up to 1950, but an increase thereafter, the actual 1958
tonnage originated being more than two and a half times that of
1950.31 Although ores stood below the middle 1930's through 1950,
the share of ferrous metals has tended to grow. But in the form
presented here the data are not well adapted to an analysis of the
significance of traffic composition from the point of view of operations.
Both a rearrangement and a comparison with U.S. composition will
shed some light on that significance. Coal and coke, ores, and petro-
leum are all included in the U.S. data under products of mines.
Petroleum products are, however, for the most part included in
manufactures. Mineral building materials for the most part belong
in the products of mines category, but such items as cement, brick,
and tile are included under manufactures in the U.S. classification.
The sum of lumber building materials and firewood in the Soviet
classification should come close to approximating our products of
forests. As animals and products are included under other freight
in the Soviet classification, there is no Soviet equivalent to this U.S.
classification.Recast under these several categories, and with the
qualifications noted above, we obtain the Soviet figures shown in
Table 15 below.
To make the U.S. data more nearly comparable, we must also adjust
them. The unadjusted figures are shown in Table 14. In effecting
adjustment, we may reduce the products of agriculture by 35 per cent
to represent items presumably not covered in the Soviet grain category,
for the proportion of grain and grain products in the United States
products of agriculture fluctuates in the neighborhood of 65 per cent.
This item, together with animals and products and less-than-carload
freight, may be included in the other freight category which we have
81Actuallycoal and coke appears to have reached a peak in 1947 at 37.2 per cent
of total tons originated.Ton.kilometrage of petroleum increased more rapidly
than tonnage and in 1958 stood at three times the 1950 figure.
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TABLE 14
CoMPosITIoN OF U.S. TRAFFIC, INTERVALS, 1930-58
(per cent of total annual tons originated)
1930 1935 19401945 1950 19551958
Products of agriculture 9.6 9.7 8.8 11.2 9.5 9.6 12.3
Animals and products 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.7 1.1 0.9 0.8
Products of mines 55.7 56.3563 51.4 55.2 54.6 52.9
Forest products 6.0 5.4 5.8 5.3 5.8 5.9 6,1
Manufactures and
niiscellaneousa 24.1 24.9 25.9 28.9 27.6 28.5 27.5
Less-than-carload 2.6 1.8 1.5 1.5 0.8 0.5 0.4
SouRcE:Statisticsof Railways in the United States for 1930, 1935, 1940, 1945, 1950,
1955, and 1958, Interstate Commerce Commission.
a Includes traffic consolidated by freight forwarders and tendered in carloads.
renamed "manufactures and miscellaneous." Thus recast, the compar-
able figures are shown in Table 15.
We may effect a further adjustment by breaking down the United
States products of mines category and taking out of manufactures and
miscellaneous certain items which we presume are covered in the
Soviet products of mines category as developed above. Following this
process, we combine anthracite and bituminous coal and coke, bring
together crude petroleum and refined petroleum products including
lubricating oils, sum up the several categories of ores and concen-
trates, and bring together as "mineral building materials" sand, gravel,
stone, artificial stone, lime, plaster. brick, cement, and tile. Thus we
are able to break down the products of mines category into elements
which should reasonably coincide with the Soviet items which we
grouped above under this head and we may transfer the remainder
of the United States classification to manufactures and miscellaneous.
The result, as given in Table 16, should represent a reasonably
comparable tabulation. It will be observed that the change between
the two broad categories is not great, but it reduces the apparent
difference between the United States and the Soviet traffic composition.
What, if anything, may be learned from so rudimentary and im-
perfectly matched a classification? Certain of the groups are relatively
homogeneous in their transportation characteristics. That is true of
the products of mines category, with the exception of very small
tonnages of certain nonferrous ores which are included. These corn-
modities are of high density and relatively low value, and may be
handled in bulk in quantities appropriate to the capacity of the cars.
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TABLE 16
COMPOSITION OF U.S. AND SovIET FREIGHT TRAFFIc, FIVE-YEAR INTERVALS, 1940-58





















Coal and coke 25.836.8 36.034.0 32.032.4 30.729.0 29.628.9
Petroleum and petro.
leum products 5.05.4 5.4 4.3 5.2 3.2 6.1 2.9 6.9 2.8
Ores 5.6 8.7 4.5 7.3 5.7 8.5 6.610.1 6.7 7.9
Mineral building
materials 18.9 8.0 10.6 6.7 18.912.2 19.414.9 20.015.7
Total products of
mines 55.358.9 56.552.9 61.856.3 62.856.9 63.255.3
Forest products 11.1 5.8 11.1 5.3 11.0 5.8 8.7 5.9 8.6 6.1
Grain 7.5 5.7 5.1 7.3 4.7 6.2 4.6 6.2 4.4 8.0
Manufactures and
miscellaneous 26.129.6 27.335.1 22.731.7 23.931.0 23.530.6
handled, except petroleum, in other than open-top equipment. The
volume of movement, especially in the case of iron ore, coal, and coke,
is great enough frequently to permit forwarding in multiple-car or
trainload lots from a given mine to a particular consuming installation
while employing cars of the greatest capacity available.82Given
a large flow over a particular route, this traffic is the most favorable
type to handle, enabling the development of heavy trainloads moving
through yards and terminals adapted to the specialized flow. The rail
costs are the lowest for such flows and the. business, when well organ-
ized, is characteristically enormously profitable even at a level of
rates quite low relative to the average.83 In the Soviet case, the long
average haul adds to the importance of the traffic in this category
and presents the railroads with a more advantageous set of circum-
stances for attaining economy per ton-mile.
The forest products category is less homogeneous. It appears that the
Soviet category is much more largely made up of logs, pulpwood, and
firewood rather than the dressed and finished lumber in the American
category. Consequently a larger portion can be satisfactorily loaded
in open-top equipment and the quality of equipment furnished for
loading is of less significance. This traffic, too, has the important
82 This tends to promote the lowest ratio of tare weight to gross weight of any
loaded movements in rail service.
83 The continued prosperity of the American bituminous coal roads and of the
ore roads, despite their short hauls, is a case in point.But the British coal roads
during an earlier period were also excellent examples both in the Welsh fields and
in the Midlands.
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advantages of being relatively free from risk in transit, having relatively
low value, and being able to load under most circumstances up to the
full capacity of the car. On the other hand, open-top loads of logs,
lumber, and poles are notorious for their propensity to shift in transit
and thus to occasion delay at intermediate yards for readjustment of
loads. When, however, the trafficis available in large volume, as
from most producing regions, it produces desirable tonnage which
can be handled with considerable economy of equipment.
Grain isalso low-grade, heavy-loading traffic which frequently
makes up into trainloads early in its movement, but it requires high-
class dosed cars for safe movement in bulk over long distances and it
suffers from seasonality. As the Soviet harvest is spread over a longer
period because of the machinery situation and since storage at origin
is stressed, the seasonal characteristic has a less serious effect than on
the roads of the western United States or of Canada.34 But it none-
theless has an undesirable effect on this traffic which is mitigated
in the Soviet case because the railroads do not serve harvesting over
a dense network of branches in the grain-growing territory to the
same extent as in most other countries with commercial grain agricul.
ture. Moreover, the bulk of line-haul transportation the year round
is performed by rail, hence the grain lines do not dry up at other than
harvest time, while the relatively low yield and spread of the harvest
tend to insure a less concentrated load. These two factors mean that
the facilities necessary for normal traffic are more nearly adequate
for the peak of the grain movement than is generally the case elsewhere
and, along with the spread induced by local storage, they render un-
necessary proportionately large advance accumulations of cars held idle
awaiting grain loading.Except for the loss of car time in such
accumulations, the grain traffic normally makes intensive use of car
equipment, provided cars are not loaded when the ability of the
terminal elevators to unload them promptly at destination is in doubt.
This factor seems to be well under control in the Soviet case.It is
worth noting that in each of the postwar years shown Soviet grain
traffic appears to have been a smaller proportion of the whole than
in the United States.
The manufactures and miscellaneous category is a catch-all of vast
scope, so varied in its composition as to permit little useful comment.
34TheSoviet position is more nearly comparable to ours before the first war.
Given dry weather, the U.S. harvest may now be concentrated within a week's time
in any particular loading area.Hence virtually all the cars required to load it
must be stored in the loading area in advance, often some weeks in advance because
of the unpredictability of the time Of arrival of grain at country elevators.
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Since it is much more limited in American statistics and since a rather
detailed breakdown is also available, something can be said of its
transportation characteristics. But our adjustments have necessitated
bringing in livestock and products, much of the agricultural category,
miscellaneous items from products of mines, less-than-carlot traffic, and
forwarder traffic, since we are not able to take out these components
of Soviet traffic. Yet it is in the relationship of this category in the
two countries, as well as in its movement over time in the Soviet Union,
that we may find some contrasts and developments of significance.
Hence we cannot dismiss it, despite its heterogeneous composition.
It is to be observed that at five-year intervals since 1930, the shares
of this category in the total in the Soviet Union have been consistently
smaller than those for the United States, by from 3 to nearly 10
percentage points and, although the lag has diminished a bit since
1950, it remained greater in 1958 than in 1940. Despite our limited
knowledge of Soviet traffic and the extensive adjustments it has been
necessary to perform, it appears likely that this catch-all category has
about the same commodity coverage in both countries. In any event,
no further adjustment is possible from the available data. Hence it
appears probable that, at least since the second war3 Soviet minerals
traffic has represented a larger proportion of the whole than in the
United States, while over the entire period since the early 1930's
manufactures and miscellaneous traffic as put together above has
lagged. Among the important items making up the category, ferrous
metals can be separated, although we cannot be sure that the separate
commodity descriptions put together from the U.S. statistics are not
more inclusive than this Soviet category. Such a comparison suggests
that ferrous metals in the United States have consistently represented
a larger proportion of total rail traffic, except in years such as 1958
when the steel industry was at a lower than average level, but the
reader is cautioned to remember that rail traffic in the U.S is much
less important and much less representative of the whole of domestic
transportation than is the case in the Soviet Union.35 Particularly
is it to be noted that a very large volume of manufactured iron and
steel moves in the United States by truck. The comparison also
indicates that there has been a change over the 1940-58 period in
35Thecomparative data for ferrous metals as a percentage of total rail traffic
are:
1940 1945 1950 1955 1958
Soviet 4.6 5.4 5.2 5.7 5.4
U.S. 6.4 6.2 6.6 6.9 5.2.
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the position of the two countries in ferrous metals traffic as a propor-
tion of the manufactures and miscellaneous category constructed
earlier. Whereas in 1940 this proportion was smaller in the Soviet
Union than in the United States, by 1945 the position was reversed
and it has remained so, although the 1950 and 1955 data do not reveal
a widening of the gap, while 1958 does not afford a good basis for
comparison because of the reduced activity in the U.S.36 The change
is a modest one and must not be accorded great significance, although
the Soviet share is probably, understated in comparison with the U.S.
one.37 It appears likely that vehicles of all kinds as well as agricultural
implements and parts stand higher in the U.S. composition, despite
the fact that the greater part of this traffic moves in the United States
by other methods of transportation. Beyond this, it is not possible
to indulge in further speculation from the limited data except to note
the probability that in food products and in consumer goods generally
there is a sharp difference in quality, limitation of variety, and form
of packaging which simplifies the problem of transportation. The
Soviet items probably move in larger unit packages, are of higher unit
density, and are frequently in a less final state of manufacture. Staples
in all likelihood form a greater proportion than goods finely tailored
for a cultivated demand attuned to style characteristics and brand
differentiation. These differences, while probably of modest signifi-
cance, nevertheless point to a manufactures and miscellaneous traffic
which it should be possible to load more rapidly and readily in the
car—traffic, in short, which is somewhat more favorable to railroad
efficiency.38
The heavier proportion of mineral traffic is, of course, favorable
to heavy car and train loading and, except under unusually bad
weather conditions, is favorable also to the rapid loading and unload-
ing of cars. This tendency is reinforced by the less fine classification
of these items by size, chemical composition, and grade, and by less
variety in the brick and tile list.It is especially notable that mineral
building materials have far exceeded the similar category in the
88Ferrousmetals traffic made up the following percentages of manufactures and
miscellaneous traffic:
1940 1945 1950 1955 1958
Soviet 17.6 19.8 22.3 23.9 22.9
U.S. 21.6 17.6 20.8 22.2 17.0
37InterstateCommerce Commission category 583,"Manufactured Iron and Steel,"
isparticularly likely to include items not embraced in the Soviet category.
88Itshouldbe observedthat, insofar as tonnage originated is overstated, itis
most likely to be of importance in this category.
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United States even though care has been taken to include in the U.S.
compilation all items that could reasonably be included under the
Soviet caption. It is difficult to account for so great an excess, but if it
is accepted at face value it represents a category. primarily composed
of commodities of highly desirable transportation characteristics con-
ducive to heavy carload and to rapid loading and unloading of cars,
particularly when handled in bulk. It is also noteworthy that lumber,
for the most part a commodity with desirable loading characteristics,
has stood at nearly twice the proportionate U.S. level over almost the
whole period selected for study and that examples of this traffic cited
in the Soviet rail press give evidence of excellent loading achieved
in practice. Like the grain traffic, the lumber traffic tends to be con-
centrated at limited points of delivery and interchange to the railroad
system and hence would appear to be originated under somewhat
more favorable circumstances than is much of the U.S. lumber traffic.
The available data are so inadequate that caution is necessary in
drawing conclusions.Nevertheless, the following comments on the
over-all composition of Soviet rail freight traffic would appear to be
justified:
1. The similarities are more apparent than the differences, but the
latter may be of sufficient magnitude to have some favorable effect on
the rail operating task.
2. Soviet products of mines appear to have exceeded the proportion
which they have represented of U.S. rail traffic since the war and
to have been not far behind the U.S. proportion between 1935 and
1945. This growing disparity is the most significant difference between
the two compositions and it is favorable to high utilization of cars
and motive power, as well as of track capacity in those areas where
minerals are preponderant in the traffic. The disparity by 1950 had
certainly become great enough to have a favorable effect upon Soviet
rail operations.
3. Forest products have consistently represented a greater propor-
tion of Soviet than of U.S. freight traffic, and this also is to be regarded
as a somewhat favorable circumstance.
4. Grain has been less important in the United States than in the
Soviet Union over most of the period, although 1945, 1950, 1955, and
1958 show the opposite relationship because of exceptionally heavy
grain movements in the U.S. during those years and the persistence
with which grain remains "rail bound" in the face of the progressive
diversion of many types of tonnage tO other forms of transport,
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5. Manufactures and miscellaneous traffic is a heterogeneous category
about which not much can be said but which appears, since 1930,
tohave been a bit lighter in Soviet than in US. traffic—significantly
so by 1955—and to have represented traffic on the average in a cruder
state of manufacture, of more limited variety, moving in large packages
or in bulk and in relatively large lots, all factors which are of some
advantage to the carriers.
6. The ferrous metals category is probably lighter in the total
composition of Soviet traffic, but heavier when expressed as a per.
centage of the manufactures and miscellaneous category to which it
belongs. This, with other factors, helps to make that category a less
difficult one for carriers to accommodate.
7. In sum, the differences in composition which the highly inade-
quate data suggest appear to be of some, but not of great, significance
from the point of view of their effect on railway operations.
8. There is a lingering doubt, however, whether the overstatement
of tonnage referred to earlier is not greater in the manufactures and
miscellaneous group than in the products of mines and timber groups
because significant underloading is more readily visible in most of the
traffic in these last two groups, thus resulting in an actual position
possibly more favorable than the data disclose.
9. What we are discussing here is the composition of railroad traffic
in the two countries. Rail traffic in the Soviet Union, if accurately
stated, should fairly represent the composition of the economy. In
the United States it does not, for railroads account for less than half
of the total movement and it is probably correct to say that as much
manufactures and miscellaneous traffic is originated and handled to
destination by truck as by rail while the great bulk of all petroleum,
both crude and refined, is originated and handled to destination by
transport other than rail.It is also likely that the general types of
manufactures and miscellaneous traffic still on the railroads, while
not representative of the whole, are reasonably similar to the types
which characterize Soviet rail traffic in this category with the notable
exceptions of forwarder traffic and a limited tonnage of high-grade
consumer goods which probably have no counterpart in Soviet traffic.
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